University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2006

Our Ignorance about Intelligence
Richard A. Epstein

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard A. Epstein, "Our Ignorance about Intelligence," 17 Stanford Law and Policy Review 233 (2006).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

INTRODUCTION:

OUR IGNORANCE ABOUT INTELLIGENCE
Richard A. Epstein*
The papers collected in this timely volume of the Stanford Law and Policy
Review vividly show-and it is a good thing-the extent to which the issues
that matter to the academic community are driven by the dominant public
controversies of the day. Nowhere is this attention more needed than in dealing
with the cluster of issues on what in polite circles is called "intelligence," but in
ordinary language goes by the less ambiguous but pointed words of "spying" or
"snooping," which we do routinely on our enemies and, yes, even on ourselves
and our friends. Yet it would not do to speak of the Central Spying Agency, or
CSA, when we can preserve the metaphor by the more diplomatic Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), which no one takes as a government branch of
Mensa.
Yet no matter what name we pick, the question of intelligence, spying, or
snooping has been with us since the beginning of the Republic, and the various
terms that we use to describe it shows vividly our collective ambiguous moral
attitude toward the entire project. The evident discomfiture that leads to the use
of polite language also has other consequences for public discourse-itself
frequently a polite term for partisan squabbling. Painful subjects are best
avoided whenever possible. So for long periods of time, the entire intelligence
issue (to stick with the polite term for the remainder of this high-minded
introduction) escapes systematic public attention because people want to
remain blissfully ignorant of the grubby work that relates so intimately,
although not necessarily positively, to the preservation of our national security.
So long as there are no visible (and risible) systematic crack ups, most people
are quite content to leave the entire field in the hands of the experts. Here are
two reasons why.
First, any debate over intelligence does not mesh well with an open and
robust public debate. The type of information that we need to make judgments
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for domestic purposes turns out in many instances to be exactly the same
information that, once disclosed to public debate, will give aid and comfort to
our enemies. There is a respectable argument that it is better to keep this
information out of the hands our own citizens than to have it publicly shared
with persons who hold hostile intentions toward our safety and survival as a
nation. There are few issues on which it could be said, the more that we know,
the more vulnerable we become. Hence, at all levels of government, we often
conduct the review of intelligence activities behind closed doors and uneasily
trust that experts in government will be able to ferret out difficulties in
operations and take sensible remedial steps to correct them. There is no
question that in times of conflict this impulse gets stronger, not weaker.
Second, the question of intelligence is just plain hard, even for those who
have the facts. It is a commonplace observation, which long predates the rise of
modem cognitive psychology, that no one does very well in making decisions
under uncertainty. The first approximation for any set of sensible decisions is
to compare costs with benefits.1 But the announcement of that (true) platitude
raises far more questions for anxious discussion than it answers. The initial
response of rational decision makers is to simply multiply the probability of
harm by the expected magnitude of its occurrence in order to make some
estimate of our expected loss. That approach works reasonably well when the
probabilities lie in the ranges of which we are familiar, which for most people
is in increments of, say, one percent. Those kinds of odds do fairly well in
guiding normal investigative work, but they do not necessarily, or even
frequently, work well with various kinds of intelligence activities that more
than one analyst has analogized to finding a needle in a haystack. This is of
course not just any needle, but information about some horrific terrorist plot
that could have massive adverse consequences to large portions of our
population. As the analogy suggests, even if we look exhaustively we might not
find that needle at all, perhaps because it just isn't there.
Multiplying two numbers (risk and severity) together is supposed to
generate "the" expected cost. However doubtful that conclusion, the one
indisputable truth is that this whole process is fertile ground for good faith
disagreement as to the seriousness of given perils, especially when it is easy to
make errors in orders of magnitude on either of these dimensions, even with the
simplest model of risk assessment. Throw in additional questions of the
variation of risk over time, attitudes toward risk aversion, judgments on the
wisdom of different methods to counter risks whose form is not fully
understood, and it is clear that assumptions necessarily made on incomplete
knowledge (a.k.a. faith) often cloud the judgments of even the ablest of
individuals. The form of this inquiry may look like the same inquiry that we
1. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004)
(discussing the use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate responses to catastrophic threats).
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have in running a cost/benefit analysis in the law of negligence or even
antitrust. In practice the stakes are far higher, and the knowledge base on which
we operate is far weaker. It's no surprise that a strong sense of intellectual
modesty steers many sound people away from working so untidy and stubborn
2
an area.
The combination of these two reasons, and doubtless others, often leads us
to keep the problem of intelligence at arm's length, even for long periods in our
nation's history. But there is nothing like the widespread perception of
systematic failure to shock us out of our collective complacency. Ignorance is
not always bliss, especially with two notable failures of recent vintage whose
ramifications are still not fully understood. Just about everyone accepts that
there was serious breakdown on intelligence over whether the Iraqi regime
under Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, and, if so, how
many and of what type. Part of the problem was doubtlessly a desire to make
the evidence conform to the politics, so that individuals in high places (they
know who they were) who were intent on deposing Saddam for geopolitical
reasons sought an undisputed public mandate for military invasion. That they
could not have had such a mandate if the "only" charges against Saddam were
system-wide human rights abuses at home, a bellicose posture with respect to
his Middle Eastern neighbors, and the easy ability to disrupt large portions of
the world's oil supply. The recriminations and protestations on that issue have
not run their course. The rise of domestic feuding, or worse, over the
pacification and democratization of Iraq, with its American involvement, gives
us a constant invitation to revisit the source of major intelligence failures.
Of equal magnitude are the terrible tragedies of September 11, 2001, and
the endless second-guessing as to what sound and proactive intelligence could
have done in order to prevent that audacious and deadly attack. The dangers
that we fear in this context are not that of geopolitical intrigue, but of
institutional rigidities, jurisdictional squabbles, bureaucratic inertia, and some
all pervasive sense of incompetence and malaise. There are endless debates as
to how far the claims of national security penetrate ordinary social life, and
equally inconclusive debates as to what parts of our economic, political, social,
and cultural lives are proper objects for intelligence oversight. Unfortunately,
the world does not divide itself up into areas that are obvious targets of
intelligence activities and those that are somehow beyond its sphere. The
problem is only made worse because spying and intelligence are highly
interactive games. Whenever we find a new way in which to detect needed
information, we can expect our enemies (and in some cases our friends) to
adopt new strategies that will diminish the effectiveness of our intelligence
initiatives. The half-life of any technological or institutional fix is likely to be

2. See generally POSNER, supra note 1, at 92-138 (discussing why policymakers are

often reluctant to use cost-benefit analysis to assess catastrophic risk).
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quite short in so tumultuous an environment.
Once these issues come to a head, opinion leaders in the nation are no
longer happy about our ignorance over matters of intelligence. Symposia, such
as this one organized by the Stanford Law and Policy Review, count as a
welcome response to the difficult problems that we face as a nation. In this
brief introduction, I will not attempt to offer any systematic answer to the
questions that our authors raise. But it is important to offer some taxonomy of
the issues that they have raised for us.
The first class of such issues is definitional. Kristan Wheaton and Michael
Beerbower take on this ticklish question with a frontal challenge to those who
think that questions of national security can be placed into one box separate
and apart from the full flow of information generated in all useful pursuits of
life. 3 They see no obvious field limitations to the business of intelligence,
which they treat as the ability to coordinate bits and pieces of information from,
as they say, all available sources in order to keep pace with our enemies. The
job of intelligence is connecting the dots: the more dots, the better.
Next there are the institutional and structural issues, which occupy the
bulk of this volume. Broad definitions of intelligence, such as that which
Wheaton and Beerbower champion, intend consciously to err on the side of
inclusiveness. These definitions, however, also expand the available scope of
the overall enterprise, and thus put greater strains on the institutions that have
to gather, collate and interpret the cascades of information that government
officials are now obliged to collect not only from the obvious suspects, but also
from all sorts of institutions-banks, insurance companies, telecoms, libraries,
you name it. Just how do we structure institutions in order to process that
information? Many of our contributors take dead aim at different facets of these
long-standing structural challenges. In dealing with the current situation, for
example, Judge Patricia Wald, who served as a member of the President's
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction, discusses our intelligence failure in Iraq, much
of which she chalks up to the confusion caused by the failure to create
institutional safeguards needed to separate the intelligence analysts' role from
the policymakers' function. 4 To her, the problem has multiple dimensions,
which she explores as she also discusses how the struggle over the appointment
of John Bolton as our ambassador to the United Nations reflects broader
concerns about the politicization of the intelligence process.
The structural theme of interest to Judge Wald, of course, does not arise
only in our contemporary setting, so that there is an urgent need to put the

3. Kristan J. Wheaton & Michael T. Beerbower, Towards a New Definition of
Intelligence, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 319 (2006).
4. Patricia Wald, Analysts and Policymnakers: A Confusion of Roles?, 17 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 241 (2006).
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modem debates into historical perspective. Our system of divided government,
which combines the principle of separation of powers with the related principle
of checks and balances, has been a historical constant since the Founding
period. While there has been much constitutional transformation of the power
of the federal government to regulate economic issues, the structural divisions
put in place by the Framers still exert a real influence in the distribution of
responsibilities among the various branches of government, so that it is critical
to keep some distance on these issues. Michael Warner takes on this historical
challenge by offering us a set of parallels between two major legislative
initiatives to bring order to our intelligence operations. 5 He starts with the
National Security Act of 1947,6 passed in the aftermath of World War II, and
then tackles the more grandly named Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, 7 enacted in the wake of 9/11. He seeks to explore the
institutional and cultural barriers that stand in the path of reform whether we
deal with the monolithic threat of world communism on the one hand, or with
the more elusive threats from the many hostile groups that operate, often
separately and clandestinely, across the globe.
The contrasts between these two acts are also the subject of Martin Halstuk
and Eric Easton's contribution, 8 which lauds the decision of the 2004 Reform
Act to eliminate any categorical exemption of intelligence information from the
requirements of The Freedom of Information Act, so that the CIA is no longer
able to wholly insulate its activities from public scrutiny. The authors conclude
that this reform is likely to help prevent repetition of the intelligence fiascos
surrounding both the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the WMD dispute in Iraq.
The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 is also the more focused inquiry of
Craig Lerner, who discusses parallels not across time, but across contemporary
social institutions. 9 One common metaphor of much vogue in policymaking
circles is the wall of separation, which need not be between church and state.
Lerner focuses on the proper understanding of two familiar walls. The first,
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,10 seeks, broadly speaking, to build up
that wall between top management and its audit committee. The second, which
is a product of the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, was intended to break
down the many walls of separation that prevented the sharing of information

5. Michael Warner, Legal Echoes: The Passages of the National Security Act of 1947
and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y

REv. 303 (2006).
6. National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495.
7. Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638.
8. Martin E. Halstuk & Eric B. Eaton, Of Secrets and Spies: Strengtheningthe Public's
Right to Know about the CIA, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 353 (2006).
9. Craig S. Lerner, Calling a Truce in the Culture Wars: From Enron to the CIA, 17
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 277 (2006).
10. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
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within the intelligence community. Lemer's thesis is that both efforts at
institutional reconstruction may be misguided. Sarbanes-Oxley represents the
usual Washington conceit that it has better information about how individual
firms should be constructed than does the market. In dealing with intelligence,
however, the government is in the very different business of running its own
shop, and in his view this congressional effort may well be a misguided effort
to force feed changes that may be undermined by extensive bureaucratic inertia
on the one hand, while at the same time removing some needed competition
between agencies and exposing the whole integrated network to a greater
danger of double agents.
His view, however, is far from uncontested. In his contribution to this
volume, for example, David Kris takes the position that we are all better off,
from the standpoint of both liberty and security, in taking down the FISA wall
because the gains from cooperation dominate the other possible effects of the
statute. 11 Information gains value when intelligence and law enforcement
officials are permitted to compare notes, while the larger group of lawyers who
watch over the process offer additional protections for civil liberties. The FISA
wall is also the object of Dianne Piette and Jesselyn Radack's historical study
of FISA, 12 which concludes that the current wall of separation was not built at,
or shortly after, the passage of FISA in 1978, but developed out of political
struggles that took place early in the Clinton administration. The authors also
explain how the history of the FISA wall helps shed light on the current
political struggles over the President's assertion of "inherent" executive
authority to conduct searches independent of FISA.
The last theme of this material addresses the larger issue of how to run an
intelligence system that respects our concerns with civil liberties. Once again

the FISA wall of separation is the target of much discussion, because of its
implications for the privacy rights of ordinary citizens, and the operation of the
criminal justice system. In dealing with these issues, all commentators
recognize the need for balance between the claims of liberty and security, but
often differ (as on so many issues) among themselves as to where the balance
should be drawn. The basic theme is set out by Senator Ron Wyden and his
coauthors who insist that however real the conflict, the United States possesses
the people, determination and ingenuity that will allow us to honor each
concern without seriously compromising the other. 13 A more cautious note,
perhaps, is sounded by both Fred Manget and Stephen Schulhofer. Schulhofer
11. David S. Kris, The Rise and Fall of the FISA Wall, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 487
(2006).
12. Dianne Piette & Jesselyn Radack, Piercing the "HistoricalMists" of FISA: The
Real Story Behind the People and Events Leading to the Passage of the Foreign Intelligence
SurveillanceAct and the Creationof the "Wall", 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 437 (2006).
13. Ron Wyden et al., Law and Policy Efforts to Balance Security, Privacy and Civil
Liberties in Post-9/1 America, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 331 (2006).
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argues that the appropriate balance has not been well struck in connection with
15
14
some key provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act) renewal,
including those which provided extensive, if not unlimited, powers of
government to require the production of records from such institutions as
libraries, political action groups, and charitable organizations.1 6 Manget attacks
this same theme from a somewhat different angle noting the genuine problems
that occur in trying to reconcile the imperatives of a silent and nimble
intelligence apparatus with the needs for our traditional criminal law process
that supplies slow and public deliberative procedures to those charged with
serious crimes. 17 In his view, the difficulties arise not solely when the
government is pressed to bring criminal charges against individuals held in
captivity as a security risk, but also in those cases in which members of the
intelligence community are subjected to serious criminal investigations that can
interfere with operations and sap morale even if no official charges are brought.
Finally, Tom Lininger argues that state bar associations have an important
role to play in preventing federal law enforcement officials from abusing the
surveillance powers granted to them by the Patriot Act. 18 According to
Lininger, the 1998 McDade Amendment 19 subjects federal prosecutors to the
ethical rules of state bar associations. He calls for an amendment of state ethics
codes to permit bar associations to sanction federal prosecutors who direct or
authorize surveillance activities that violate people's civil liberties.
In a short introduction, I shall not even attempt to hint at my views on this
cluster of issues, which are on most issues very much a work-in-progress. As a
committed defender of limited government in the classical liberal tradition,
there are many areas of human life in which I would like to keep the
government at bay. I see little or no reason for state regulation of employment
contracts for example, and I cautiously accept only limited forms of land
planning. But neither of those strategies works here, for try as one might,
intelligence is a legitimate government function-assuming that we have any
government at all. At this point, I have no particular point of privilege over the
rest of the pack in promoting small government solutions. Like everyone else I

14. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
15. USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat.
192 (2006).
16. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign-Intelligence Surveillance, 17
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 531 (2006).

17. Fred F. Manget, Intelligence and the Criminal Law System, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 415 (2006).
18. Tom Lininger, Federalism andAntiterrorism Investigations, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 391 (2006).
19. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified in relevant part at 28
U.S.C.A. § 530B).
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have to work through a field that is beset with serious questions: What is the
scope of its basic mission? What is the appropriate institutional design to carry
that mission out? And, what is the best way to integrate the work of the
intelligence system with that of the criminal justice system in ways that have a
fair shot at preserving liberty while promoting security? It is an open question
whether anyone shall be able to propose any long-term solution that will
command universal consent on a matter so fraught with difficulty. But now that
we are in our season of open discontent, we must take the risk of public
discourse on these knotty problems of statecraft. No longer can we take the
posture of that great philosophical muse, David Hume, who concluded after
deep reflection that "carelessness and inattention" afford the only solutions to
the most tenacious problems of the day.20 Today, the stakes are too high for
ignorance to be our institutional response to matters of intelligence.

20. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 218 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
Clarendon Press 1888).
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